By jupiterschild
It is no secret that in the past I have not pulled many punches when it comes to the assessment of Margaret Barker and her attempts to reconstruct lost Old Testament beliefs (that dovetail nicely with particular LDS concepts) from much later texts. Equally culpable, in my view, were (mostly untrained) LDS thinkers who jumped on the Barker bandwagon, culminating in a university-wide forum at BYU and other talks to faculty and students in 2003. I wondered on other blogs whether her lack of a PhD (at least one earned in the traditional manner) made her more creative but also less rigorous (in terms of sound method, not in terms of productivity–she is prolific). I delighted to hear an advisor of mine call her “diachronically crazy”.
But all that changed for me when I realized that Margaret Barker is right. Read more »
By Chris Henrichsen
Author’s note: I originally posted this at Approaching Justice. The talk by Elder Oaks has gotten me thinking about the implications of public reason on the SSM debate and the use of public reason (directly and indirectly) in Elder Oak’s talk. I do not have the time right now to adequately address that speech. So, this is an introduction to the idea of public reason with a look at both John Rawls and Abraham Lincoln.
It is often noted that the late American political philosopher John Rawls had a great admiration for President Abraham Lincoln. While people often express admiration for Lincoln, there are many theoretical similarities between the thought and actions of Lincoln and the grand political philosophy of Rawls. For the purposes of this essay I would like to look at one particular aspect of Rawls’ work in which he can see parallels between his own theory and the thought of Lincoln. The aspect of Rawls’ work of which I speak is the idea of public reason. Below I will summarize the idea of public reason and then look at how public reason plays a role in Lincoln’s thought with particular focus on his second inaugural address.
The idea of public reason is rooted in Rawls’ later work about political liberalism, which for Rawls focuses on the hope that no matter what our religious or philosophical disposition we can all agree on a conception of justice that can form the basis of democratic legitimacy. Public reason within political liberalism places parameters upon the reasons that public officials can use in forming law and policy. Primarily, public official must appeals to publicly and commonly held ideas and concepts. Examples of such concepts would be the principles of liberty and equality found in the Declaration of Independence or the tenant of the Preamble of the Constitution (i.e. general welfare or common defense). Appeals to such concepts would be reasonable to all even if there is disagreement about the details or content of certain principles.
On the other hand, public reason limits or rejects arguments rooted solely in religious or philosophical doctrines that cannot be deemed reasonable in a public arena. One cannot support a policy position solely on the assertion that “the Bible says so.” Not only are such arguments tenuous because few policies can clearly be shown to be found in the Bible one way or the other, but such claims are meaningless and unconvincing to those the view the Bible differently or who find no meaning in it at all. According to Rawls, a policy lacks legitimacy if it is rooted in religious doctrine that not all could reasonably accept.
Read more »
By smallaxe
I overheard part of an interesting discussion this past Sunday when a member of our ward was discussing traveling to China. Knowing that “tea” would be served at practically every meal, this member wondered what kinds of teas were against the Word of Wisdom. I don’t recall the entirety of the answer, but I do remember one of the people involved in the discussion explaining that “tea” in Chinese could refer to anything from water to black tea. Read more »
By jupiterschild
Deseret Mutual Benefit Administrators (DMBA), the Church’s insurance company, does not cover prescriptive contraception, for any reason that relates to (“voluntary”) contraception. That is, any Church employee or covered spouse (including BYU employees) that wants contraception requiring a prescription must pay for it entirely out of pocket. The only exceptions for this relate to the physical (not mental) health of the woman: endometriosis, ovarian cysts, etc. Postpartum depression is not a valid medical issue that would result in an exception to this exclusion. This is clearly not an economically motivated decision.
This is not a post meant to criticize the Church; rather it is to ask about the extent to which public discourse matches the “private” (that is, non-Church-wide) practices controlled directly by the Church. Read more »
By TT
Using Elder Oaks’ guide to would-be critics of church leaders, I’d like to explore some of the implications of this important text. In this talk, he recommends five options for those who wish to criticize the church. First, one can overlook the difference. This doesn’t mean that one must accept the leader’s view, but simply not act on it. Second, like the first, is to reserve judgement and not act on it for a time. This requires that one reflect substantially before acting because upon further consideration one may change their mind or the situation may be resolved. Third, one may meet and discuss the criticism privately with the leader. Fourth, one may meet privately with a higher leader to discuss the problem or send a letter. And fifth, one may pray for a resolution. Options 1, 2, and 5 require complete silence, while options three and four offer the relative silence of a “private” meeting or letter. None requires that one simply accept the leader’s views. The strength of Elder Oaks’ teaching is that silence is offered as a spiritual practice as a virtue. I’d like to compare this practice to the practice of biblical interpretation based on inerrancy.
Read more »
By TT
The topic of “criticism” of Church leaders has arisen again in the blogs in response to three recent important talks: 1) Elder Holland’s Oct 2009 General Conference address on the Book of Mormon, 2) Elder Oaks’ BYU-I talk about preserving religious freedom, and 3) Elder Hafen’s remarks on “same sex attraction.”
In trying to formulate my own thoughts about the role of criticism in the church, I went back to look at some things that FPR bloggers, including myself, had said on this topic before. Many of these posts attempt to lay a foundation for a critical stance toward the church that is fully inside, while attempting to account for the conditions in which such criticism is possible, but also seeking its limits. I offer them for your enjoyment and consideration as well.
Read more »
By Chris Henrichsen
BYU’S TOCQUEVILLE PROJECT
With funding from
THE JOHN ADAMS CENTER
For the Study of Faith, Philosophy and Public Affairs
PRESENT A SYMPOSIUM
Religion and Politics:
The Philosophical Problem and its Contemporary Implications
October 29-30, 2009.
Thursday, October 29
5pm B192 JFSB: Keynote Address: Daniel Mahoney (Professor of Political Science and Chair, Assumption College, Worcester, MA), “Moral Foundations of Liberal Democracy”
Response by Neal Kramer (BYU, English)
Friday, October 30
9am 4010 JFSB: Jeremiah John (Southern Virginia University, Politics): “The Site of Mormon Political Theology”
Response by Richard Sherlock (Utah State University, Philosophy)
10am 4010 JFSB: “Mormons and the Public Square: the Facts on the Ground”
Chris Karpowitz & Quin Monson (BYU Political Science)
Response by David O. Leavitt (Attorney)
1pm B192 JFSB: Peter Lawler (Dana Professor of Political Science, Berry College, GA) Science): “Dignity and Higher Education Today”
Response by Brant Bishop (Attorney)
3pm 4010 JFSB: Roundtable & Open Discussion: “Mormons and the Public Square”
Thomas B. Griffith (U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit)
Frederick Gedicks (BYU Law)
Ralph Hancock (BYU Political Science)
5pm 4010 JFSB: Scott Sprenger (BYU French): “Religion and Modernity in the Work of Honoré de Balzac”
By TT
In the recent talk by Elder Oaks to BYU-I addressing the topic of the constitutional right to free speech and free exercise of religion, he also noted the establishment clause of the first amendment.
The prohibition against “an establishment of religion” was intended to separate churches and government, to prevent a national church of the kind still found in Europe. In the interest of time I will say no more about the establishment of religion…
The difficulty with this omission was evidenced in the reaction to his speech. Many of the debates about the place of religion in public life tend to focus on either free exercise or the establishment clause, to the detriment of the other. Religionists, as in the case of Elder Oaks, tend to emphasize free exercise, while secularists tend to emphasize disestablishment. Each views the other as a threat, and Oaks’ overlooking of the limitations of the establishment clause in relationship to free exercise plays into the fears that those who emphasize the role of religion in public do so at the expense of the establishment clause.
Read more »
By Chris Henrichsen
Authors note: The following is the second in my Mormon Rawls Project Series. It is also the expansion of my first ever post here at FPR.
When Rawls develops the concept which he labels “justice as fairness.” This does not mean that a just society is one which is fair, but instead that principles of justice must be determined under conditions which are fair to all.
While fairness may not be something commonly found in the world, we can imagine what the conditions of fairness might appear like. This is what Rawls does when he introduces the original position (OP). The original position is a hypothetical situation where representatives come together to determine the principles of justice that will govern the basic structure of society (the basic structure being the political and economic institutions which impacts ones life-chances) . It is these principles that would guide the development of a constitution and further development of law and policy.
In order to ensure that these principles are chosen under fair conditions. Rawls introduces the device known as the veil of ignorance. The veil of ignorance prevents the participants from knowing the particulars of their own situation and standing in the world. They are unaware of their own wealth, gender, race, and geographical situation. They are essentially stripped of the knowledge that might lead than to pick principles of justice which benefit themselves or people like themselves rather than principles that benefit all and which could be accepted by all. Read more »
By Chris Henrichsen
John Rawls is a prominent 20th century philosopher. While his work is well respected, it is also a great source of controversy. Much of this controversy is rooted in the fact that his work has forced those in the areas of moral and political philosophy to pay attention.
I was first introduced to Rawls my senior year at the University of Utah. My first reaction was one of confusion and frustration. It is tough reading. That semester, I read both A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993). The later work on political liberalism reached out to me at first, partially because it was a bit friendlier read, but primarily because of Rawls argument that reasonable comprehensive doctrines (religious or philosophical worldviews) could accept liberal democratic principles of justice as the basis for a constitutional regime.
Rawls argues that his principles, known of justice as fairness, could represent the type of principles that reasonable world views could accept as part of an overlapping consensus. Rawls’ principles of justice are as follows:
1. Equality of basic liberties (a full range of basic civil and political liberties similar to those found in the Bill of Rights and the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments of the US Constitution).
2a. Offices are open to all (equal opportunity).
2b. Economic arrangements must benefit all with the only acceptable inequalities of wealth be those that most benefit the least well off (this is known as the difference principle). This principle ultimately calls for and requires a radical for of economic and social equality.
Now I will be delving into these principles in more detail in future posts, but I was struck a decade ago with how closely LDS principles of agency and economic equality. In many ways, Rawls seeks to show that equality and liberty are not in opposition with each other, but they actually go together hand and hand. Read more »
